DL-Attacks and their Consequences

The Discrete Log Problem:

\textbf{(DLP)} Given \( g \in G \) (where \( G \) is a group), and

\[ y = g^x, \]

find \( x = \text{DLog}_g(y) \), the discrete log of \( y \) to the base \( g \).

General DL-Algorithms/Attacks:

\textbf{Log-table method:} Make a table of all pairs \((x, g^x)\).

Time: \( O(n) \) multiplications; Storage: \( O(n) \) group elements, where \( n = \text{ord}(g) \).

\textbf{BSGS} (= Baby-Step-Giant-Step) - due to Shanks (1970):

Idea: find \( r, s \) such that \( x = r[\sqrt{n}] + s \) by using log tables of size \( \sqrt{n} \).

Time: \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) multiplications; Storage: \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) elements.

\textbf{Pollard’s \( \rho \) Method} - due to Pollard(1978):

Idea: Random walk. Construct a function \( f = f_y : G \to G \) and express \( y_k = f^k(y_0) \) recursively as \( y_k = g^{x_k} y^{z_k} \) for \( k = 1, 2, \ldots \). Look for coincidences \( y_{k+t_i} = y_k \); these yield relations

\[ (x_k - x_{k+t_i}) \equiv x(z_{k+t_i} - z_k) \pmod{n} \]

from which \( x \) can be computed.

Time: \( O(\sqrt{n}) \) multiplications; Storage: \( O(1) \) elements.

\textbf{Pollard’s \( \lambda \) (or Kangaroo) Method} - due to Pollard(1978):

Exploits the birthday paradox: The footprints of two kangaroos hopping around will eventually cross.
**SPH** - due to Silver, Pohlig, Hellman (1978):

Idea: using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the DLP for $G$ can be reduced to the DLP for its subgroups of prime order $p | n$.

Time: $O(\sum_{p | n} (e(p) \log n + \sqrt{p})$ group operations + $O((\log n)^2)$ bit operations (for CRT).

Storage: $O(1)$ elements, if Pollard’s method is used.

**Index Calculus:** - developed out of factorization programs

Idea: 1) Set up a factor base $\mathfrak{B}$; 2) Compute the discrete log $x(b) = \text{DLog}_g(b)$ for each $b \in \mathfrak{B}$ by solving a system of linear equations; 3) Find an exponent $z$ such that $yg^z$ is “$\mathfrak{B}$-smooth”, i.e. such that we can determine exponents $e(b)$ with the property that

$$yg^z = \prod_{b \in \mathfrak{B}} b^{e(b)}.$$ 

Then we have:

$$x = \text{DLog}_g(y) \equiv \sum_{b \in \mathfrak{B}} x(b)e(b) - z \pmod{n}.$$ 

Note: Although this method works in principle for any (realization of the) group $G$, it is only practical if a suitable factor basis $\mathfrak{B}$ can be found, i.e. one for which the relations leading to the system of linear equations can be found efficiently. Such bases are only known for $G = \mathbb{F}_q^\times$, but not for $G = E(\mathbb{F}_q)$, where $E$ is an elliptic curve.

Examples: 1) If $G = \mathbb{F}_p^\times$ ($p$ prime), fix $B << p$ and take $\mathfrak{B} = \{\text{primes } q \leq B\}$. 

2) If $G = \mathbb{F}_q^\times$, where $q = p^n$, fix $M < n$ and take
\[ \mathfrak{B} = \{ p(x) \in \mathbb{F}_p[x] : \deg(p) \leq M, p(x) \text{ irreducible} \}. \]

**Time:** If $G = \mathbb{F}_p^\times$, then the above leads to a subexponential algorithm:

\[ \text{Time(to solve DLP)} = L_p \left( \frac{1}{2}, c \right) \]

for some $c > 0$, where
\[ L_p(r, c) = O \left( e^{c(\log p)^r(\log \log p)^{1-r}} \right). \]

**Consequences:**
1) By SPH, groups of sufficiently large prime order are the safest for cryptosystems based on (DLP).
2) To design a safe cryptosystem based on the (DLP) in $G = \mathbb{F}_q^\times$, one has to take $n$ (and hence $q$) much larger than for a cryptosystem based on the DL-problem in $G = E(\mathbb{F}_q)$.

**Recommendation:** A.K. Lenstra, E.R. Verheul (Sep. 1999) propose the following minimum key sizes (in bits):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RSA</th>
<th>SDL</th>
<th>EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>q</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>2174</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>4047</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>4047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here SDL = subgroup discrete log (use $G \leq F_p^\times$ of size $q$ bits) and EC = elliptic curve discrete log (in $G \leq E(\mathbb{F}_q)$). (wo/w = without/with cryptographic advances).